Introduction
Punitive damages have never been uncontroversial. 1 Today, the public has grown concerned over the size of punitive damages. 2 Some have asserted that punitive damages are completely unconstitutional. 3 Still others have defended the use of punitive damages on the grounds that "punitive damages can be a useful tool for deterring the wrongdoer and others who are similarly situated from engaging in intentional or willful conduct that may injure others." 4 Some have argued that punitive damages serve to "redress the harms caused by defendants who 1 See, e.g., Fay v. Parker, 1872 WL 4394, 41 (N. H. Dec. 1872) ("The idea is wrong. It is a monstrous heresy. It is an unsightly and unhealthy excrescence, deforming the symmetry of the body of the law."); Spokane Truck & Dray Co. v. Hoefer, 25 P. 1072, 1075 (Wash. 1891) ("we believe that the doctrine of punitive damages is unsound in principle, and unfair and dangerous in practice."); Murphy v. Hobbs, 5 P. 119, 122 (Colo. 1884) ("the reflecting lawyer is naturally curious to account for this 'heresy' or 'deformity,' as it has been termed. Able and searching investigations made by both jurist and writer disclose the following facts concerning it, viz: That it was entirely unknown to the civil law; that it never obtained a foothold in Scotland; that it finds no real sanction in the writings of Blackstone, Hammond, Comyns, or Rutherford; that it was not recognized in the earliest English cases; that the supreme courts of New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Indiana, Iowa, Nebraska, Michigan, and Georgia have rejected it in whole or in part; that of late other states have falteringly retained it because 'committed' so to do; that a few years ago it was correctly said, 'at last accounts the court of the queen's bench was still sitting hopelessly involved in the meshes of what Mr. Justice Quain declared to be 'utterly inconsistent propositions;'' and that the rule is comparatively modern, resulting in all probability from a misconception of impassioned language and inaccurate expressions used by judges in some of the earlier English cases. injure persons beyond the individual plaintiffs in the particular case." 5 Others have said that plaintiffs should be allowed to pursue punitive damages as a way to "fine" actors defying their rightful legal obligations, serving essentially on the public's behalf. 6 The controversy has been waged on the Supreme Court level in this country. In
Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vermont, Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., Justice O'Connor warned that "[a]wards of punitive damages are skyrocketing." 7 The Court later found that excessive punitive damages can violate the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 8 The Court has most recently concluded that "the Constitution's Due Process Clause forbids a State to use a punitive damages award to punish a defendant for injury that it inflicts upon nonparties or those whom they directly represent." 9 Even before this line of cases, Justice Rehnquist had opined that "even assuming a punitive 'fine' should be imposed after a civil trial, the penalty should go to the state, not to the plaintiff-who by hypothesis is fully compensated." 10 Some states have followed Justice Rehnquist's suggestion and have diverted part of punitive damage awards to the state by statute. 11 The Ohio Supreme Court, without authorization from a statute, has allocated punitive damages away from a plaintiff and towards "a place that will achieve a societal good, a good that can rationally offset the harm done by the defendants in this case." 12 Some scholars have argued that punitive damage allocation is unconstitutional. 13 State supreme courts have struck down allocation statutes on the ground that they are unconstitutional takings. 14 However, the only federal circuit to review such a law has upheld it. 15 While the traditional justification for allocating punitive damages to the state or charity has been to avoid giving a windfall to the plaintiff, Mitchell Polinsky and Yeon-Koo Che have argued that allocating punitive damages away from the plaintiff also has the benefit of lowering litigation costs. 16 They reasoned that by increasing the amount of damages that defendants pay while lowering the recovery that plaintiffs receive, defendants would take more care while plaintiffs sued less often, leading to lower litigation costs. 17 However, Choi and Sanchirico have argued that this model creates a risk of under deterrence. 18 They claim that Polinsky and Che's model, while reducing litigation costs, also reduces the plaintiff's incentive to put effort into the litigation, which in turn reduces the probability that the defendant will be held liable. 19 My paper first proposes a way to cure Polinsky and Che's model of such a defect by linking it with Polinsky and Shavell's model of punitive damages. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven
Shavell have argued that punitive damages should be imposed when there is a possibility that the defendant escape liability for committing the tort and that the size of the punitive damage award should depend on the compensatory damages and the probability of escaping liability. 20 For instance, if there is a 10 percent chance of escaping liability, under Polinsky's model the multiplier is 1.11. If the compensatory damages are $1 million, the punitive damages should be $111,000. Under the scheme I am proposing, 90 percent would go to the plaintiff in this situation, which is approximately $100,000. Now if the chance of escaping liability goes up to 20 percent, the multiplier goes up to 1.25 and the punitive damages would go up to $250,000. The percentage that would go to the plaintiff would decrease to 80 percent, but the absolute amount that goes to the plaintiff actually increases to $200,000.
Next, I propose a trifurcated trial structure based on the model proposed by Judge Jack
Weinstein in a class action against tobacco companies in the earlier part of the decade that divided the class action into three phases. 21 In the first phase, compensatory damages would be decided by the jury. 22 In the second phase, the jury would determine whether the defendants' conduct warranted punitive damages. 23 In the third phase, the jury would determine the amount of punitive damages to be awarded to the class and how they would be allocated. phases: one to determine the class wide liability of the defendants to be used as a predicate for determining punitive damages, another to determine if the defendant's conduct warranted punitive damages, and a final trial to determine the amount of punitive damages to be awarded to the class and how they would be allocated. The first trial would use sampling to determine the total liability of the defendant. Both sides could negotiate how many trials they would use to determine this liability, and then multiply the average by the number of class members. The result would be set aside in an insurance fund to compensate the class members. The second trial would determine whether the defendant is deserving of punitive damages by considering the "reprehensibility" of the defendant's actions. Finally, the third stage would determine the amount of punitive damages by measuring the likelihood of the defendant escaping liability for similar actions. The punitive damage award would be allocated by the judge partially to the plaintiffs and partially to the state based on an inverse multiplier system. All damages awarded for punishment and not deterrence purposes would go to the state. Attorneys' fees and other litigation costs would be divided between the compensatory award and punitive damage award on a pro rata basis. The percentage of the award to be given to the plaintiffs would be inversely proportionally to the deterrence multiplier. The number of juries would be determined by the number of sample trials selected by the parties at phase one. Also, there would be a separate jury for stages two and three.
I. Calculating and Allocating the Punitive Damage Award

A. Basing the Amount of Punitive Damages on the Likelihood of Escaping Liability
The theory of punitive damages I will use at this stage was outlined by Professors Polinsky and Shavell in their paper. 28 Like them, I believe that punitive damages should primarily serve the purpose of deterrence. They start with the belief that when a defendant will definitely found liable for the harm for which he is responsible, damages should equal the harm the defendant has caused. 29 If damages are less than the harm caused, than firms might take too few precautions, while if damages are more than the harm caused, than firms might take too many precautions. 30 However, sometimes the defendant will be able to escape liability, in which case imposing damages equal to the harm may significantly under deter the defendant because the liability the defendant expects is the total harm he or she has caused multiplied by the probability of being held liable. 31 To solve this problem, Polinsky and Shavell propose that the total damages imposed on a defendant should equal the harm multiplied by the reciprocal of the probability that the defendant will be found liable when he ought to be. 32 The jury should first award compensatory damages and then award punitive damages based on the multiplier.
To give an example, assume that total compensatory damages awarded in a lawsuit were $1,000,000. Let us then assume that there is a 90 percent chance that the defendant will be held liable. Under Polinsky and Shavell's model, the damages multiplier is 1/.9 or 1.11. The punitive damage award in that situation would be $110,000, and the total award would be $1,110,000. If the defendant has a 25 percent chance of being held liable, then the defendant's multiplier is 1/.25 or 4. The total award would be $4,000,000 with punitive damages totaling $3,000,000.
One of the advantages of this model is that punitive damages will rarely exceed compensatory damages by a 9 to 1 ratio. One of the guideposts the Court has used to determine whether a punitive damages award meets due process is the ratio between harm to the plaintiff 29 Id. at 878. 30 Id. at 879. 31 Id. at 888-889. 32 Id. at 889. and the punitive damages award. 33 While the Court has never imposed a bright-line rule, it has said that "in practice, few awards exceeding a single-digit ratio between punitive and compensatory damages, to a significant degree, will satisfy due process." 34 If a defendant under Polinsky and Shavell's model has a 10 percent chance of being held liable, then the multiplier is 10, meaning that for $1,000,000 of compensatory damages there will be $9,000,000 in punitive damages. In order to get beyond a 10 to 1 ratio, the defendant would have to have less than a 10 percent chance of being held liable. Situations like that may actually be considered an exception to the general rule. The Court has allowed punitive damages awards that exceeded that ratio by quite a bit.
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B. Allocating the Punitive Damage Award
After the jury decides the amount of damages, the court will decide how they will be allocated. Punitive damages can be an undeserved windfall to the plaintiff, particularly if the damages are extremely high. As a result, many states have passed statutes saying that in the event of a punitive damage award only part of the award will go to the plaintiff while the rest will be allocated to the state. 36 recovery of the plaintiff gives the plaintiff less incentive to put effort into the litigation, which in turn reduces the probability that the defendant will be held liable. 39 My model is different in that the recovery of the plaintiffs actually increases while the percentage of the plaintiffs' recovery of the punitive damage award decreases. The percentage of the punitive damage award going to the plaintiff has an inverse relation to the damages multiplier determined by the jury. For instance, if the compensatory damage award is $1,000,000 and the jury find that the defendant had a 90 percent chance of being held liable, than the damages multiplier will be 1.11 and the punitive damage award will be $110,000. In that situation, the plaintiffs would receive 90 percent of the punitive damage award, which is $99,000. If the jury found that the defendant had an 80 percent chance of being held liable, than the multiplier would be 1.25 and the punitive damage award would be $250,000. Of that award, 80 percent would go to the plaintiffs, which would be $200,000. It could be argued that there is still a problem of under deterrence, although it is a smaller one. Because the plaintiff is not eligible for a windfall, the plaintiff will still not invest as much to secure the judgment as the defendant does to avoid it. This may be true, but deterrence has to be balanced against other objectives such as lowering litigation costs and preventing a windfall to the plaintiff. As I said earlier, these factors must be balanced against each other.
Some objections have been made to allocation on the basis that they violate the Constitution. State supreme courts have struck down such laws as unconstitutional takings of property. 40 Bethany Rabe has argued that turning punitive damages over to the state converts them into civil fines subject to the Excessive Fines Clause. 41 Rabe has also argued that punitive damages are "essentially criminal in nature" and that due process is offended when they are handed out without the procedural safeguards of the criminal system. compensatory damages to be used by the defendant to increase the energy efficiency of their apartment units or improved the appliances within the apartment.
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C. Damages Awarded for Punishment
Polinsky and Shavell also allow, in their model, for juries to award punitive damages in order to fulfill the "punishment objective." 61 They leave open the possibility for the jury to award damages purely for the sake of punishment. I would like to leave this option open for the jury, but I am nervous about the incentives it would have on the plaintiff. Given the reverse multiplier I outlined earlier, I have the concern that the plaintiff may wish to emphasize punishment while deemphasizing the likelihood of escaping liability. In doing so, the plaintiff would increase the total punitive damage award while keeping his or her share of the award constant. Therefore, if the jury decides to award addition punitive damages purely for punishment, then all of those damages should go to the state. Ideally, no such damages would be given at all because the combined compensatory and punitive damages should be sufficient to punish a firm that has committed a mass tort.
II. The Trifurcated Trial Structure
As stated earlier, I will situate this system of punitive damages in the middle of a trifurcated trial structure. The model for punitive damages will be used at Phase III when the amount of punitive damages will be decided. At Phase I a sampling system will be used to determine the aggregate punitive damage award and then distribute it. At Phase II, the jury will decide whether the defendant's behavior is sufficiently reprehensible to merit punitive damages.
A. Using Sampling to Determine Compensatory Damages At Phase I
60 802 F.2d 405, 409 (11 th Cir. 1986). 61 See Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 20, at 949-950 ("Notwithstanding these reservations, it is possible that individuals do want to personify firms and punish them as entities, and the reader can make up his or her mind about the importance of this way of defining the punishment objective. To the extent that it is important, the imposition of punitive damages on a blameworthy firm directly promotes the punishment objective, much as it does when the defendant is a culpable individual.").
Sampling has been used by courts to deal with class actions with a large number of class members in order to reduce the time and cost of determining liability. 62 It involves trying a few cases within the class, using them to find an average liability, and then extrapolating the liability to the other members of the class. Appellate courts are divided on its permissibility. 63 Using traditional trials to process these claims entails great expense in terms of litigation costs, insurance deductibles, and time. 64 Sampling produces a more accurate outcome because the average represents the true worth of a lawsuit more than any given award by a jury. 65 Any given award in a traditional trial is likely to be an over or under-award relative to the true worth of the suit as shown in the average award, and individual awards can vary due to "random noise in decision making" as much as legally relevant distinctions. 66 Sampling also meets the requirements of due process because the liability imposed by sampling is not significantly more than traditional trials would impose and there is little or no risk of erroneous deprivation of the defendants' property.
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Sampling may also serve such non-instrumental values such as equality before the law, predictability, transparency, rationality, and revelation, though other non-instrumental values such as the right of the plaintiff to communicate his or her own views may be compromised. 69 Id. at 840. 70 Id. at 836. 71 Rosenberg, A New Sampling Method, supra note 64. 72 Id. at 3. 73 Id. at 3, fn. 7. 74 Id. at 3. 75 Id. 76 Id.
The chief virtue of this system is that it saves litigation expenses "while preserving the deterrence, compensation, and other functions of a civil liability regime." 77 While some courts have complained that sampling should not be used if it cannot approximate the result that would be determined in separate trials in order to implement the proper deterrence, Rosenberg argues that it is the ex ante probable liability that matters in deterrence. 78 This system only affects the defendant's aggregate liability and damages and does not affect the compensation of the plaintiffs, which will be decided in separate proceedings. 79 If compensation is decoupled from aggregate liability, as is being proposed here, the defendant should not care how compensation occurs. In addition to reducing costs, average claim sampling also has the advantage of being a simple model that is easy to understand so the total liability can be determined by courts quickly.
Whatever the benefits of average claim sampling, in order to apply it the court must accept the legal reasoning behind sampling, which, as noted earlier, the courts are divided on.
The Fifth Circuit, when deciding Cimino v. Raymark Industries, 80 decided that the case before them was distinguishable from Hilao because the suit in Hilao was a suit under the Alien Tort Claims Act and did not operate under the restraint of the Rules of Decision Act or Erie. 81 Cimino involved a sampling scheme divided into three phases where there would be a complete jury trial for ten class representatives and a class-wide determination of issues such as product defectiveness, warning, and punitive damages in the first phase, the exposure on a craft and job site basis was stipulated to in the second phase, and 160 different sample cases would be tried to determine an average which would then be extrapolated to the rest of the class. was no attempt to prove causation in the phase three judgments or the extrapolation cases, the court found that the judgments were "fatally flawed." 83 However, average claim sampling is different from the model imposed in Cimino because the plan in Cimino involved the court choosing the sample size of 160 based on information provided by the plaintiffs. 84 In average claim sampling, the two parties would negotiate the size of the sample or, if they could not reach an agreement, submit the desired sample size to the court and allow the court to pick the bigger sample. In reaching an agreement, both parties would be waiving their right to challenge the other cases on the basis of causation or damages because they did so voluntarily. If one party utterly refuses to allow any sampling, then it can simply submit to the court that the desired number of trials is the same as the number of class members, and under this model the court would be obligated to try each of those cases. If the parties cannot agree and one party submits a higher number to the judge that is lower than the total class size, than both sides have waived their legal rights to challenge the results based on the untried cases.
One party could insist on trying every case, but given the accuracy of a good sample at determining liability and the high litigation costs that would come with doing this, it is unlikely that either party would view that as a rational option. It has been argued that having multiple juries violates the Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial because all interrelated issues must be tried before one jury in case one jury reexamines the finding of another. 112 The Seventh Circuit has found that "the judge must not divide issues between separate trials in such a way that the same issue is reexamined by different juries." 113 In the Rhone-Poulenc Rorer case, the court found that the use of multiple juries was inappropriate because the first jury would be used to decide whether the defendant was negligent and subsequent juries would decide issues that pertained to the negligence of the defendant such as comparative negligence of the plaintiff and proximate causation. 114 The multiple juries here would not be considering the same question, however. The juries finding fact at Phase I would only be deciding questions pertaining to the individual trials they are adjudging. The juries in Phases II and Phases III would not reconsider the size of the compensatory damage award. The jury at Phase II will consider the reprehensibility of the defendant's actions and the other factors I have mentioned while the jury at Phase III will only consider the likelihood of the defendant escaping liability. Different issues will be decided at each stage, and each jury in the sampling stage will not reconsider the findings of another jury.
B. Setting Aside Compensatory Damages into an Insurance Fund Judgment
It could be argued that there is a signaling problem here in that the jury at Phase III could take the positive result at Phase II as evidence that non-parties were harmed and inflate the amount of the award at Phase III. The solution is to keep the juries ignorant about the overall structure of the trial. The jury at Phase III will not see the jury instructions the jury at Phase II received and will not know what factors that jury was allowed to consider. The Court in Phillip Morris found that the judge's refusal to instruct the jury not to punish the defendant for harm done to non-parties was what violated due process. 115 Here the jury is being instructed not to consider harms done to non-parties, so this should satisfy that court that improper considerations are not being made.
Conclusion
In summation, each phase of the litigation works to achieve specific goals in the class action suit. Phase I exists to determine the required compensation and to set the compensatory award that will serve as the basis of any future punitive awards. Sampling will be used at this level to lower litigation costs. Phase II will be used to establish a base level of reprehensibility to satisfy due process and corrective justice views of punitive damages. Without establishing a basis of reprehensible behavior or "societal damage" the law suit will likely never reach Phase III. Phase III will then be used to enforce optimal deterrence and allocate the windfall in a way to create the proper incentives to pursue the suit.
Providing proper deterrence, maintaining due process, and reducing litigation costs is a balancing act. However, there is a way to do all three, as I have outlined here. There may be, at times, a need to balance one objective against the other. For instance, it may not comport with optimal deterrence to force the plaintiff to prove reprehensibility at Phase II before employing punitive damage award is on solid constitutional ground. Furthermore, the balance between reducing litigation costs and ensuring optimal deterrence can be struck by ensuring that recovery goes up but not to the same extent as the punitive damage award overall. It could be argued that ensuring that the plaintiff puts in the optimal effort into the suit requires giving the plaintiff the full award, but this concern must be balanced against other concerns of giving the plaintiff and underserved windfall and encouraging speculative litigation. At the same time, some of the punitive award must be given to the plaintiff to encourage the plaintiff to through with this model. The model I have outlined assumes the structure of a class action and is not applicable to traditional individualized trials. 6. The harm done to non-class members.
Appendix
In assessing the damages to which the plaintiffs are entitled you may take into account any of the following that you believe from the evidence have resulted from the defendant's action.
1. Any bodily injuries sustained and the extent and duration thereof;
2. Any effect of such injuries upon the health of the plaintiffs according to its degree and probable duration;
3. Any physical pain and mental anguish suffered by the plaintiffs in the past, and any that may be reasonably expected to be suffered by them in the future; 4. Any disfigurement or deformity resulting to them and any humiliation or embarrassment associated therewith;
5. Any inconvenience and discomfort caused in the past and any that will probably be caused in the future;
6. Any doctors, hospitals, nursing, and medical expenses incurred in the past and that may reasonably be expected to occur in the future;
7. Any loss of earning in the past by reason of being unable to work at his calling;
8. Any loss of earnings or lessening of earning capacity he may reasonably be expected to sustain in the future;
9. Damage to the property of the plaintiff as a result of the defendant's actions.
From these as proven by the evidence your verdict should be for such sum as will fully and fairly compensate the plaintiffs for the damages sustained by them.
Plaintiff 1
The amount necessary to compensate plaintiff 1_________
Plaintiff 2
The amount necessary to compensate plaintiff 2_________ (This will continue for as many trials as the plaintiffs and defendants agree on.)
Plaintiff X
The amount necessary to compensate plaintiff X_________ Add the damages due to all plaintiffs together and then divide by X to determine the average liability of the defendant. Then, multiple the average liability by the total number of class members to determine the aggregate liability.
Average liability___________ Aggregate liability____________
Phase 2
Damages are of two types: compensatory damages, which are awarded as compensation for pecuniary loss and recompense for the injury suffered, and punitive damages, which are something in addition to full compensation, not given as the plaintiff's due, but as punishment to the defendant and as a warning and example to deter him and others from committing like wrongs. At this stage, you will determine whether the defendant's conduct is deserving of punitive damages. You will determine whether the defendant's actions can rightly be called reprehensible. Among the things you may consider are whether the defendant harmed the plaintiffs intentionally, the harm done to nonparties to the suit by the defendant's actions, and the potential harm the defendant could have caused by his actions. If you find the defendant's conduct to be reprehensible, then the defendant will be eligible for punitive damages.
Was the defendant's conduct reprehensible? Yes______ No_______ Phase 3
At this stage you will determine the amount of punitive damages. The damages should be based on two factors: the amount needed to deter the defendant and other similar actors and the amount needed to fully punish the defendant for his actions. Your calculation of deterrence should be based on the likelihood that the defendant might have escaped having to pay for the harm for which he or she is responsible. You should estimate the probability of escaping liability, find the reciprocal, and then multiply the compensatory damage award determined at Phase 1 by the resulting number. When determining additional amounts needed to fully punish the defendant for his reprehensible act, you should remember that other damages also punish the defendant. After having determined this amount, add the damages necessary for deterrence and the damages necessary for punishment together to determine the total punitive damage award.
You are not to consider the harms possibly done to non-class members when calculating this award.
Probability of defendant escaping liability_________% 1/ probability of defendant escaping liability__________=multiplier
Compensatory damages multiplies by the multiplier_________=deterrence award Additional amounts needed to fully compensate plaintiff_________=punishment award.
Punishment award + deterrence award= punitive damage award 
